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An inevitable consequence of the Great War was the interruption or
breaking up of commercial voyages it necessarily brought about.
These acts of interference have occasioned much litigation on the
question of the amount of freight earned by vessels thus rendered
unable to complete their voyages, and have given renewed importance
to an interesting subject of admiralty and contract law. The imagina-
tion has not conjured more varied and romantic circumstances than the
actual facts of maritime adventure, as disclosed in the prosaic pages
of the law reports. It may, therefore, be of interest to discover how
the courts have dealt with the effect of these varying facts of force
majeure, whether by act of man, God, or Government, in determining
the validity and extent of the shipowner's claim to freight.
The contract of affreightment is practically always reduced to
writing, whether in charter-party or bill of lading, and embodies the
terms of the carriage. Leaving out of account the special contracts
of time-charter and lump freight,1 the contract usually provides that
freight shall be paid on a given quantity of cargo from port A to port
B at a certain rate. This is the common use of the word "freight,"
and Scrutton defines it as "the reward payable to the carrier for the
carriage and arrival of the goods in a merchantable condition, ready
to be delivered to the merchant."12 While primarily the right to and
amount of freight depend upon the strict construction of the contract,
the common form of contract and custom in the absence of special
contract have led to the standard rule that freight is not earned until
the cargo is delivered.3
'Lump freight, according to Scrutton, The Contract of Affreightment (8th
ed., 1917) 327, is a gross sum stipulated to be paid for the use of the entire ship;
it is payable if the shipowner is ready to perform his contract, though no goods
are shipped, or though part of 'the goods shipped is not delivered. But if
shipped, some must be delivered to entitle the shipowner to lump freight. See
The Norway (1865) 3 Moore P. C. (N.s.) z45; Thomas z. Harrowing S. S. Co.
[x915, H. L.] A. C. 58.2 Scrutton, op. cit., at p. 318, citing Kircher v. Venus (1859) z2 Moore P. C.
361, 390; Dakin v. Oxley (1864, C. P.) 15 C. B. (N. s.) 646, 665; Cargo ex Galam
(1863, P. C.) B. & L. 167.
'Cook 7. Jennings (3797, K. B.) 7 T. R. 381; Osgood v. Groning (I8io, K B.)
2 Camp. 466; Barker v. Cheriot (18o7, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 2 Johns. 352. In the
latter case, Thompson, J., expressed the usual rule: "This was one entire
voyage from New York to Martinique and back again; and as the vessel was
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FREIGHT ON UNCOMPLETED VOYAGES
In the courts of common law, the contract was deemed entire and
indivisible, and the right to any freight depended upon full perfor-
mance of the contract. This rule was not varied by the fact that
part performance often conferred great benefit on the shipper, possibly
even greater benefits than full performance would have. 4 The courts
of admiralty, however, frequently assumed jurisdiction of freight cases,
particularly when the voyage had been interrupted by peril of the sea,
and when, in time of war, their prize jurisdiction attached. These
courts, being less strictly bound by technical rules of the common law,
were more willing to allow equitable considerations to dictate greater
liberality to the shipowner who, without fault on his part, had been
prevented from completing the voyage, yet had performed much labor
and had probably conferred benefit on the shipper. The influence
of these courts induced a modification in all courts of the strict formula,
by ascribing to certain operative facts legal effects which changed the
position of the parties, either by excusing full performance without
penalty of loss of freight, or by inferring a new contract for partial
freight. To assume, therefore, that whenever a voyage is not com-
pleted no freight has been earned would be to court error. Probably
the best method of arriving at the present state of the learning on the
subject is to study the cases and operative facts which have raised the
issue of freight. This we shall endeavor to do.
.PREPAID FREIGHT
The case of prepaid freight, at least according to 'English law, is
somewhat beside our inquiry, for by the anomalous rule of that law,
prepaid freight cannot be recovered, even in the event of the loss of
the goods or non-completion of the voyage.5 While the rule of the
captured on her return, and did not deliver her return cargo, no freight is due,
notwithstanding the defendant may have had the benefit of the outward voyage,
because, by -the express agreement of the parties, the outward and homeward
voyages were one, and the profit depended upon the entire performance. This
is too well settled to admit of being questioned."
Where capture, wreck, stranding, or theft by pirates prevents the cargo
from reaching its destination, no freight is due according to continental law.
Belgium, Commercial Code, Art. 97; France, Art. 3o2; Germany, Art. 618;
Holland, Art. 482; Italy, Art. 577; Spain, Art. 66I.
'Hopper v. Burness (1876) Q. B. 34 L. T. (N. s.) 528; The Industrie [1894,
C. A.] P. 58, where sale of the cargo at an intermediate port for legitimate
maritime purposes brought a higher price than it would have at destination.
'Byrne v. Schiller (1871) L. R. 6 Exch. 319, L. J. 40 C. L. (N.s.) 177; Allison
v. Bristol Marine Ins. Co. (1876, H. L.) I A. C. 209, 226. Brett, J., in the latter
case explains the rule thus: "It arose in the case of the long Indian voyages.
The length of voyage would keep the shipowner for too long a time out of
money; and freight is much more difficult to pledge, as a security to third
persons, than goods represented by bill of lading. Therefore the shipper agreed
to make the advance on what he would ultimately have to pay, and, for a
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American law6 and of the maritime countries of continental Europe
makes no exception as to prepaid freight, commercial usage has
usually attached to the prepayment of freight a bill of lading clause
reading "Freight prepaid, and not to be returned, ship lost or not
lost."' 7  This exceptional condition, having thus become a matter of
contract, takes the case outside the customary rule as to the earning
of freight.
GENERAL RULE
The true test of the right to freight, said Willes, J., in Dakin v.
Oxley" is, "whether the service in respect of which the freight was
contracted to be paid has been substantially performed," or, as laid
down in other cases,9 whether its performance has been prevented by
act of the shipper.
The courts have not been disposed to treat the contract of affreight-
ment as dissolved by a capture or by a marine disaster.0  Only when
the circumstances indicate legal impossibility of performance or an
abandonment of the transportation by shipowner or cargo-owner will
the courts treat the original contract as terminated, or accord the
shipper the privilege of so considering it.
consideration, took the risk in order to obviate a repayment, which disarranges
business transactions." Cockburn, J., in Byrne v. Schiller, supra, said: "I
regret that such should be the law. It seems to me to be founded upon an
erroneous principle, and to be anything but satisfactory." See a learned note
in (1871) 15 SoLIcIToR's JoURNAi. 834. The rule began with Anonymous, Case
271 (1683, K. B.) 2 Shower, 283. See Coker v. Limerick S. S. Co. (igi8, H. L.)
34 Times L. R. 296. Parties may of course contract that freight shall be paid on
consideration of the cargo being taken on board, or the voyage merely begun.
'Griggs v. Austin (1825, Mass.) 3 Pick. 20; Minturn v. Warren Ins. Co. (1861,
Mass.) 2 Allen, 86; Watson. v. Duykinck (i8o8, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 3 Johns. 335.
7 The Gracie D. Chambers (1918, C. C. A. 2d) 253 Fed. 182, (1919) 28 YAIE
LAw JOURNAL, 279, (1919) 248 U. S. 387, 39 Sup. Gt. 149; Allanluilde Transport
Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co. (I918) 248 U. S. 377, 39 Sup. Ct. 147.
'Supra note 2, at p. 664.
'Cargo ex Galam, supra note 2; Cargo ex Argos (1873, P. C.) L. R. 5
A. C. 134.
"0 The Racehorse (i8oo, Adm.) 3 C. Rob. iOI; Palmer v. Lorillard (i8og, N. Y.)
16 Johns. 348, 354; The Nathaniel Hooper (1839, C. C. ist) 3 Sumner, 542;
The Teutonia (1872, P. C.) 4 A. C. 171, 182, I Aspin. 214, 220. In the last
case it was said: "The contract is not to be treated as dissolved if by any
reasonable construction it can be treated as still capable in substance of being
performed." Owens v.-Breitung (igig, U. S. D. C., S. D. N. Y.) N. Y. LAW
JOURNA, Aug. 12, 1919, aff'd. Dec. 8, igo, C. C. A. 2d. According to continental
maritime law generally, the shipper must wait a reasonable time until the
impediment to continuance of the voyage is removed; the law usually enumerates
the cases (i) in which one party or the other is justified in treating the contract
as cancelled, and (2) in which the law automatically dissolves the contract.
Sieveking, German Law relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea, (London,
1907) 78, 228.
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The law affords the shipowner, where his ship has met with an
impediment, a reasonable time still to earn his freight, either by repair-
ing or transshipping in another vessel.". Only after he has had such
an opportunity and has failed to avail himself thereof is the contract
deemed abandoned, and the owner of the goods entitled to have them,
without payment of any freight. In the case of Clark v. Massachusetts
Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,12 two months was considered not an unreason-
able time for this purpose.
One of the clearest legal expositions of the effect of an extraneous
impediment or interference on the contract of affreightment after the
voyage has been begun, is to be found in a decision of Chief Justice
Kent in the case of Palmer v. Lorillard.;
3 In that case a cargo of
tobacco from Richmond to New York was, after reaching Norfolk,
prevented from going forward by a British blockade at Hampton
Roads. The shipper, demanding his goods, contended that the contract
of affreightment was dissolved and that he was entitled to his goods
without payment of freight. Kent answered the contention as follows:
"It is a general, and an acknowledged rule, that the voyage must
be performed according to the contract, before the shipowner or master
can demand his freight. The conveyance and delivery of the cargo is
a condition precedent, and must be fulfilled. A partial performance
is not sufficient; nor can a partial payment be claimed, except in special
cases. But if the delivery be prevented by the act of the shipper,
or if he dispense with it, the master may then demand his whole
freight ...
"It is only contended by the defendants below that the contract was
still in operation, and that they had a right to retain the goods, and
wait for an opportunity to fulfil the contract; and that if the other
party elected to receive back their goods, they were then bound to pay
the freight. The reason is, that the blockade of the mouth of the
Chesapeake by British ships did not dissolve the contract, but only
suspended for the time its performance, and the defendants had a
continuing and subsisting right to wait until they had an opportunity
to go to sea. This was a right they had, and it was the only means of
indemnity for the time, labor and expense already bestowed upon the
contract. The plaintiffs could not deprive them of this right without
their consent, or without tendering to them the stipulated compen-
sation ...
' Cook v. Jennings, supra note 3; Shipton v. Thornton (1838, Q. B.) 9 Ad. &
El. 314, 335; The Maggie Iammond (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 435, 458; Harrison v.
Fortlage (1896) i61 U. S. 57, 64, 16 Sup. Ct. 488; The Blenheim (1885, Adm.)
io P. 167. The continental codes generally expressly provide that the shipper
must wait a reasonable time for the repair of the ship. Belgium, Com. C.
Arts. 89, 94; France, Art. 296; Germany, Arts. 638, 64o; Holland, Art. 478;
Italy, Art. 57.o; Spain, Arts. 677, 683.
"(1824, Mass.) 2 Pick. lO4. Several continental codes specify in certain
contingencies, such as embargo or outbreak of war, the time the shipper must
wait, usually three, sometimes five months.
"Supra note 1o, at p. 354. See also Story, J. in Jordan v. Warren Ins. Co.
(84o, C. C. Ist.) I Story, 353; The Teutonia, supra note IO.
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"The case of an embargo is a very strong case in the English law to
show that a temporary impediment to a voyage does not, of itself, work
a dissolution of the contract of affreightment; and as long as the con-
tract remains in force, it will undoubtedly be conceded, that neither
party can, by his own act or volition, dissolve it without the assent of the
other. It is well settled that an embargo does not dissolve any maritime
contract. It is only a temporary restraint which suspends for a time
its performance and leaves the rights of the parties in relation to each
other untouched."
The legal relations between the parties with respect to freight when
the voyage has been interrupted by unavoidable cause have been
succinctly described by Lord Ellenborough in the leading case of
Hunter v. Prinsep. We quote from the opinion of Mr. Justice Blatch-
ford in The Tornado.14
"The law in regard to the respective rights and liabilities of shipper
and shipowner, where cargo has been carried for a part of a voyage,
is nowhere better expressed than by Lord Ellenborough, in Hunter v.
Prinsep, io East, 378, 394:
" 'The shipowners undertake that they will carry the goods to the
place of destination, unless prevented by the dangers of the seas, or
other unavoidable casualties; and the freighter undertakes that if the
goods be delivered at the place of their destination he will pay the
stipulated freight; but it was only in that event, viz., of their delivery
at the place of destination, that he, the freighter, engages to pay any-
thing. If the ship be disabled from completing her voyage, the ship-
owner may still entitle himself to the whole freight, by forwarding the
goods by some other means to the place of destination; but he has no
right to any freight if they be not so forwarded; unless the forwarding
them be dispensed with, or unless there be some new bargain upon this
subject. If the shipowner will not forward them, the freighter is
entitled to them without paying anything. One party, therefore, if
he forward them, or be prevented or discharged from so doing, is
entitled to his whole freight; and the other, if there be a refusal to
forward them, is entitled to have them without paying any freight at
all.' 1"
There are then several possibilities when a voyage is interrupted
by extraneous agency: the shipowner may be entitled to no freight,
to partial freight, or to full freight, depending upon the circumstances.
To determine the present state of the law it has seemed best to
make an analysis of the cases that have arisen, and to classify them
according to their operative facts. Only thus will it be apparent that
a fairly clear line runs through them, and only thus will a systematic
presentation of legal doctrine be possible.
NO FREIGHT
The cases in which no freight has been allowed on uncompleted
voyages, in application of the general rule, disclose the presence of
" (1882) 1o8 U. S. 342, 347, 2 Sup. Ct. 746, 749.
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operative facts making the legal conclusion either equitable or necessary
by reason of a contract stipulation The classification essayed below
indicates therefore a limited application of the rule to specific types
of cases; where these operative facts are not present or where other
facts are present, to be detailed hereafter, either pro rata freight or
full freight has been allowed the shipowner.
(a) No freight has been allowed where there was a total defeat
of the object of the voyage.
Ships have occasionally started on their voyages, but before pro-
ceeding any substantial distance they were brought back, owing to
some supervening cause, either war or marine disaster. In such cases,
it has been held that there was a total defeat of the object of the
voyage and no freight has been allowed. 5
In the recent case of The Appam,16 a vessel on a voyage from
"The Isabella Jacobson (I8or, Adm.) 4 C. Rob. 77 (Ship few days out on a
long voyage, met bad weather, became leaky and returned. Swedish embargo
then prevented sailing and cargo unladen and restored to shippers). Almost
identical facts in Allanwilde Transport Co. v. Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 7
led to a different conclusion, because freight was prepaid and by bill of lading
was to be retained "irrevocably." Liddard v. Lopes (i8og, K. B.) lo East, 525;
Birley v. Gladstone (1814, K. B.) 3 M. & S. 205; Curling v. Long (1797, C. P.)
i B. & P. 634 (Ship captured in the river before "breaking ground," recaptured,
taken to another port and cargo sold for benefit of shippers; no freight allowed
because the ship had not "conferred any benefit on the freighters by the carriage,
or bettered the goods in the smallest degree by the expenses incurred.") ; The
Louisa (1813, Adm.) i Dod. "317, 319 ("the voyage having been totally defeated
by the sale of the goods at Corunna," an intermediate port of distress, without
consent of the owners, under authority of the British Vice-Consul).
The continental law is based on different principles, looking not to the benefit
conferred but to the burden and labor borne by the ship. Thus in case delivery
becomes impossible after commencement of the voyage by reason of a prohibition
of trade with the port of destination, the following rules prevail: If the ship
is chartered "out and home," freight is due for the outward voyage, according
to the law of Belgium (Com. C. Art. 91), France (Art. 299), Holland (Art.
504). In Italy (Art. 572) full freight is due even if the captain must put
back to the port of origin, but if the ship is chartered "out and home," one-half
the entire freight or of the two freights together is due. In Portugal Art. 548
accords pro rata freight if delivery is prevented by vis major, war, blockade or
prohibition of trade, and by Art. 549 outward freight plus one-third freight for
the return or extra voyage is due, whether the ship comes back or goes to another
port. In Germany, the rule is complicated by the question whether the prohibi-
tion is due to ship or cargo, and whether the voyage is thereby completely
terminated or only delayed. The general rule is that if either party would by
the facts be privileged to cancel the contract, pro rata freight according to
distance covered has been earned. Cf. Art. 63o, 634. Sieveking, op. cit. note Io,
at p. 228, ff. Where, however, the cargo is completely lost short of its destin-
ation by wreck, stranding, theft by pirates, or capture by enemies, no freight
is due according to continental law. Belgium (Com. C., Art. 97), France (Art.
302), Germany (Art. 618), Holland (Art. 482), Italy (Art. 577), Spain (Art.
661).
16 (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 243 Fed. 230, 234. In the leading case of Luke v. Lyde
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Africa to England was captured by a German raider, a prize crew was
put on board, and she was brought by that crew to Norfolk, Va. The
owner's claim for a possessory lien for freight was disallowed because
of the total defeat of the object of the voyage, in addition to the loss
of the lien by the hostile capture and abandonment of the original
voyage.
(b) No freight has been held due where the completion of the
voyage was rendered illegal.
In several cases arising at the beginning of the European War, a
British ship bound for a German port was barred from continuing the
voyage to Germany on the ground that the war had made such a voyage
illegal for a British ship. The leading case probably is that of The
St. Helena,17 bound with a general cargo including phosphate rock
from Tampa, Florida, to Hamburg. Reaching the Lizard on August
3, 1914, she was warned by the Admiralty of the imminence of war
and of the advisability of taking the goods to an English port. This
was done. On August 4, war was declared between England and
Germany and the further prosecution of the voyage became illegal and
impossible. The phosphate was released to the defendants as neutral
owners, whereupon the plaintiff shipowners asked in the King's Bench
Division for a declaration that they were entitled either to full or
pro rata freight. Rowlatt, J., dismissed the action on the ground
that, the voyage not having been completed, no freight was due, and
that by taking the goods from the court in England no new agreement
could be inferred to substitute the new voyage for the original one
and hence pro rata freight was not due. The case was distinguished
from The Teutoni a,18 in which a voyage to Dunkirk, France, by a
German ship was likewise rendered illegal by the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian war of 187o. The ship put into Dover, England,
where the consignee accepted the goods. The same full freight as to
Dunkirk was allowed, because under the contract Dover was construed
to be an alternative port of delivery.
(1759, K. B.) 2 Burr. 882, there was a similar deviation by capture and recap-
ture, after 17/21 parts of the voyage from Newfoundland to Lisbon had been
completed. The ship was taken to Biddleford, a greater distance from Lisbon
than Newfoundland. Lord Mansfield nevertheless allowed pro rata freight,
presumably on the theory of detriment to the plaintiff, and apparently because
the shipper took the goods at Biddleford. The decision has been severely
criticized, as contrary to principle, which requires "benefit to the defendant"
See Keener, Quasi-Contracts (1893) 253. Mansfield attributed great weight
to the acceptance by the shipper, without inquiring closely whether it was
voluntary or involuntary, an important criterion in the later cases.
"' The suit of the shipowners agiinst the cargo-owner was first brought in
the King's Bench Division as St. Enoch Shipping Co. v. Phosphate Mining Co.
(an American corporation) [1916] 2 K. B. 624; the owners later made their
demand for freight in the Prize Court, where on appeal to the Privy Council
it was likewise disallowed. The St. Helena [1916, P. C.] 2 A. C. 625.
' (1871, Adm.) 3 A. & E. 394, (1872, P. C.) L. R. 4 A. C. 17. See note io,
supra.
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The owners of the St. Helena then made their demand for freight
in the Prize Court, which has jurisdiction of all incidents of a prize
seizure, even where goods are ultimately released. 19 Although Sir
Samuel Evans allowed some freight, referring the amount to a referee,
the Privy Council on appeal disallowed the claim on the ground that
the contract of affreightment was terminated when, on August 7,
the shipowners abandoned the voyage which had become illegal on
August 4 by the outbreak of war. That abandonment ended all claim
to freight; and it could not be revived by a subsequent seizure of the
goods by a Prize Court.
It will be observed hereafter that prize courts have frequently
awarded compensation in lieu of freight to shipowners against captors
where, by reason of a seizure jure belli, which turns out to be unlawful,
the ship has been deprived of the opportunity of earning freight which,
but for the seizure, it lawfully could have earned. So where the
seizure results from the incapacity of the goods, rather than of the
ship. Even where the incapacity attaches to both, compensation has
been allowed in the discretion of the Prize Court, particularly where
the voyage when begun was lawful.20  Even as between shipowners
and cargo-owners such a claim has been allowed.2 '
(c) No freight is due where suit therefor is brought on the original
contract, but there has been a failure of full performance.
When suit for freight on an uncompleted voyage has been brought in
covenant, nothing less than full performance has been deemed to
warrant recovery. In these cases, though force .najeure prevented
delivery, it has been held that the shipowner assumed the risk of
inability to deliver as covenanted. To sustain a claim to freight,
some new operative fact must have intervened, such as a waiver of
delivery by the shipper by word or act, and the suit must then be in
assumpsit on a new implied contract.
This rule has been applied in several extreme cases. For example,
in Scott v. Libby,22 a vessel was chartered on a voyage from New York
"' The Corsican Prince [1916] P. 195; The Appam, supra note 16.
"The Juno [1916] P. 169.
' So with respect to cargo released to Russian owners, without admission of
wrongful seizure, from a British ship sailing from a Black Sea port to Hamburg,
before the outbreak of war, the ship putting into England after the declaration
of war, where cargo was seized as prize. The lob [1916] P. 206, 212. The
rule of continental law where war makes continuation of voyage illegal is
stated in note 15, supra.
(18o7, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 2 Johns. 336. See also The Hiram (i8oo, Adm.)
3 C. Rob. i8o. Luke v. Lyde, supra note 16, was distinguished by Sir William
Scott because the cargo there had been carried to Biddleford, and not back
to the port of departure, though it is hard to see how any more benefit was
conferred on the cargo-owner by taking it to Biddleford, further from its
destination, Lisbon, than Newfoundland, the port of origin. Luke v. Lyde,
though used as an authority, lacks every foundation of reason for sustaining pro
rata freight, except possibly voluntary acceptanoe by the shipper, which is by
no means clear.
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to St. Domingo and return. On arriving in sight of St. Domingo she
was turned away by a British cruiser, the port being blockaded, and
returned with her cargo to New York. In an action of trover, for
goods detained for freight, it was held that delivery of the cargo was
a condition precedent to freight, and the blockade having under the
circumstances dissolved the charter party, and no new implied contract
being inferrable from waiver of delivery or acceptance at any interme-
diate port, the claim to freight either under or outside the contract
must fail. Of course, no benefit was conferred on the cargo when it
was brought back to New York.
23
In Cook v. Jennings24 the action was in covenant for freight on a
cargo of deals to be delivered at Liverpool from Wiborg. The ship
was wrecked and the deals put ashore in Denmark, where the cargo-
owner had to take them against his will to preserve his property. Suit
on the covenant was held to require delivery at Liverpool, and barred
any claim for less than full freight, in the absence of an express new
agreement. The rule was not varied even where the sale of part of
the cargo for necessary repairs at an intermediate port of distress was
effected at a much higher price than the price of destination ;25 nor
'The French Ordonnance de la Marine (i68i) (Valin, Coinncitaire, Book 3,
Tit. 3, Art. 15) gives the shipowner outward freight, when commerce with
the port of destination is- prohibited after departure of the vessel. The same
rule is embodied in Art. 299 of the French Commercial Code. For the rules of
continental law, see note i5, supra.
"Supra note 3. So in Osgood v. Groning, supra note 3, where on a voyage
under charter from Charleston to Hamburg, plaintiff's vessel was advised in
the English Channel that the Berlin and Milan decrees would subject the vessel
to confiscation if it proceeded to the continent. It therefore put into London,
and discharged. The cargo-owners refused to receive the cargo short of
destination. It was held that the shipowners were entitled neither to freight
under the contract, not having performed, nor to compensation for the voyage
as far as London, there being no substituted agreement, express or implied, for
partial freight. See also The Industrie, supra note 4, at p. 75 (sale of damaged
cargo by master in port of distress; by German law full freight is allowed under
such circumstances, the master being considered the agent by necessity of the
cargo-owner). In Castel and Latta v. Trechman (1884, Q. B.) i Cab. & El. 276,
the port of destination, Taganrog, was under blockade, and so the ship made
delivery at Constantinople. Although this was a reasonable course to pursue,
it was held not covered by the clause "so near thereunto as she could safely get,"
and there being no voluntary acceptance or new agreement by the shipper, no
freight was allowed.
'Hopper v. Burness (1876, Q. B.) 34 L. T. (N. s.) 528 (the shippers being
given the option to demand damages for the sale or to treat the proceeds as a
forced loan; having done the latter, they were not liable for any freight). The
continental rule of maritime law would be different; full freight would be
allowed in Belgium (Com. C., Art. 93), France (Art. 298), Holland (Art. 480),
Germany (Art. 617, Sieveking, op. cit. note io, at p. 227), Italy (Art. 575),
Portugal (Art 555), and Spain (Art. 659), the captain being deemed the agent
of the shipper, where sale is for legitimate maritime needs. Accounting for the
price in general average is implied. But where, after sale at the intermediate
port, the ship is lost, pro rata freight only is due. Germany (Art. 632), Holland
(Art. 48o), Spain (Art. 659-2).
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where the ship meeting with disaster, was abandoned by her crew and
brought to her destination by salvors, the cargo being there sold and
half the proceeds turned over to the shippers. No freight was in this
case allowed in a suit on the charter-party, though a quaere was raised,
whether an action in assumpsit might not have justified pro rata
freight.
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(d) No freight has been allowed where the shipper has been com-
pelled, without prior intention or premeditation, to receive his cargo
(or the proceeds thereof) either from a prize court or court of admiralty
or at an intermediate port after shipwreck or other disaster.
In the leading case of Hunter v. Prinsep27 a cargo was sold at an
intermediate port by the master without authority of law, after a wreck,
and the shipowners claimed the proceeds on account of freight pro rata
itineris. The claim was denied, principally because the shipper had
not assented to the sale; by mere acceptance of the proceeds, it was
held, he had not indicated an intention to dispense with the delivery
of the cargo at its destination. By the sale the master had placed
such delivery beyond his power. The effort was made to distinguish
the case of Baillie v. Moudigliani,28 in which freight pro rata was
allowed the shipowner out of the proceeds of a sale by an admiralty
court, on the theory that in that case the sale was lawful. Subsequent
cases, however, have established the conclusion that the justifiability of
the sale makes no difference whatever.29 Any sale without the shipper's
consent bars freight. For even where the shipper has had to take his
goods from the hands of the court, the shipowner being unable or
unwilling to forward them, no freight has been allowed.30 So where
'Post and Russell v. Robertson (i8o6, N. Y. Sup. Ct) i Johns. 24, 27. By the
law of several continental countries, pro rata freight is due on goods salved
after shipwreck or recapture. France (Art. 303), Germany (Art. 632), Holland
(Art. 483), Italy (Art. 578), Spain (Art. 662).
2 (i8o8, K. B.) io East, 378.
' (1785, K. B.) Park, Marine Insurances (6th ed. i8o9) 70. Lord Ellenborough
in Hunter v. Prinsep also pointed out the very special facts of the Baillie Case,
which he deemed unique and alone sustained the judgment.
V lierboom v. Chapman (1844, Exch.) 13 M. & W. 23o, 238; Hopper v.
Burness, supra note 25. Had the shipowner insured the freight, he might, of
course, recover it on a policy of insurance, though he could not recover it from
the shipper. The rule in the maritime law of continental Europe is different;
a justifiable sale for maritime necessity entitles the shipowner to full freight
(supra note 25). Even in the case of goods jettisoned for the common benefit
full freight is due, subject to general average adjustment. Belgium (Art. 96),
France (Art. 30i), Germany (Arts. 619, 713), Holland (Art. 481), Italy (Art.
576), Portugal (Art. 555). In Spain (Art. 66o) pro rata freight is allowed, sub-
ject to general average.
'The Fortuna (18o9, Adm.) Edw. 56, 58; Sampayo v. Salter (1816, C. C. D.
N. H.) i Mason, 43; Caze v. Baltimore Ins. Co. (1813, U. S.) 7 Cranch, 358;
Hurtin v. Union Ins. Co. (i8o6, U. S. C. C. 3d) i Wash. 530; Armroyd zt
Union Ins. Co. (z811, Pa.) 3 Binn. 437. On the continent, pro rata freight would
in such cases generally be due, assuming the ship put in in distress and was unable
to proceed. See France (Art. _-6), Holland (Art. 478), Italy (Art. 570),
Spain (Art. 657).
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goods are taken over by the owner at an intermediate port after ship-
wreck or other maritime disaster or impediment preventing delivery at
destination.31 The essential element of the disallowance of freight in
these cases is that the shipper, making the best of a bad or unexpected
situation, has been compelled against his will and without an option in
the matter, to receive his cargo at an intermediate port.
(e) Where there has been an abandonment of the vessel and the
voyage by the master or shipowner, no freight has been allowed, even
though salvors ultimately brought the cargo to port.
It was not an easy problem to determine the effect upon a contract
of affreightment of a compulsory abandonment of a vessel through
peril of the sea. On the one hand, it was argued that property in
the vessel is not lost by this act, any more than it is by belligerent
capture, and that therefore no intention to abandon the contract can
be assumed. If the cargo therefore is brought to port by salvors, the
shipowner should have the opportunity of earning his freight by
resuming the voyage, or, if the cargo-owner claims his goods, he
should pay the shipowner reasonable compensation for his services.,a
On the other hand it was argued that the abandonment of the vessel
without intention to retake possession, if not a repudiation of the
contract, was at least such a departure from its terms and intent, that
it gave the cargo-owner the privilege of electing to treat the contract
as terminated and of taking his cargo wherever he could get it, without
payment of any freight. This is the argument that has prevailed in
the courts. 32  It was sustained by Justice Holmes in a five to four
decision in the case of The Eliza Lines,3  where a vessel on her way
from Pensacola to Montevideo was justifiably abandoned by her crew
in consequence of a sea peril and brought to Boston by salvors. The
Osgood v. Groning, supra note 3; Cook v. Jennings, supra note 3; Metcalfe
v. Brittania Iron Works Co. (1877, C. A.) L. X 2 Q. B. 423, 36 L. T. 451
(original destination being blocked by ice, cargo landed at another port against
owner's protest); Castel and Latta v. Trechman, supra note 24; Hill v. Wilson
(1879) L. R. 4 C. P. 329 (damaged cargo sold, without shipper having oppor-
tunity to exercise any option). On the continent, pro rata freight would in such
cases generally be due, assuming the ship put in in distress and was unable to
proceed. See France (Art. 296), Holland (Art. 478), Italy (Art. 570), Spain
(Art. 657). If the captain was able and willing to proceed after repair or to
transship in another vessel, the shipper could have his goods only on payment
of full freight.
"'a This in fact is the general rule of continental law. Supra, note 26.
"The Kathleen (1874, Adm.) L. R. 4 A. & E. 269, 2 Aspin. 367; The Cito
(i881, C. A.) 7 P. 5, 4 Aspin. 468. See the severe criticism of the Cito Case
by Wendt, Papers on Maritime Legislation (3d ed. 1888) 627 and the distinction
he makes between The Kathleen, where the cargo was too badly damaged to
warrant carriage to destination, and The Cito, where the cargo was practically
undamaged. The Arno (1895, C. A.) 72 L T. 621, 8 Aspin. 5; The Eliza
Lines (i9o5) 199 U. S. 119, 127, 26 Sup. Ct. 8, 9.
" Supra note 32.
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master claimed the vessel and asserted his intention of proceeding with
the voyage; to this the cargo-owners objected, claiming the cargo
without duty to pay freight. This contention the court sustained,
dismissing as immaterial the point, left open in The Cito and The
Arno,3'4 whether the shipowner, regaining possession of the vessel
before the cargo-owners had intimated an election, might keep the
contract alive for the purpose of enabling him to carry on the goods
and earn his freight. It seems that only the cargo-owner has the
election of treating the contract as subsisting or terminated, and it
would seem that it is immaterial whether the abandonment was justi-
fiable or not. In case of unjustifiable abandonment, the shipper would
still have his action for tort, without liability for freight.
But the important operative fact is the abandonment without animus
revertendi or spes recuperandi. Bruce, J., in The Arno said:
"The real question is whether, so far as the owner of the ship is
concerned, there was on his part, or on the part of his servants, an
act done so clearly indicating his intention not to carry out the con-
tract, as to entitle the owners of the cargo to treat that act as putting
an end to the contract."
Applying this test, the act of the crew of a ship in distress boarding
a rescue ship, the two ships being navigated to an intermediate port in
company, was construed as not an abandonment conferring a privilege
of election to terminate the contract, so that the shippers could not
obtain their cargo except on payment of freight.3 5 Nevertheless,
it is not easy to support. the decision of the House of Lords in the
recent case of Bradley v. Newsom, Sons & Co.,38 in which the defen-
dant's ship, while on a voyage from Archangel to Hull, with a cargo of
lumber, was attacked by a German submarine off Scotland, and the
crew compelled to leave the ship. The Germans attempted to blow up
the ship, but her cargo kept her afloat, and she was subsequently towed
into Leith by a patrol boat. The master, however, believed that she
had been sunk and so telegraphed his owners. The cargo-owners,
learning of her arrival at Leith, claimed possession, free from any claim
to freight, on the ground that the defendants had abandoned the
prosecution of the voyage. The defendants later carried the cargo to
Hull, without prejudice to the rights of the parties. The majority
of the Hofuse of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, held that as the
"Supra note 32.
"The Leptir (1885, Adm.) 5 Aspin. 411. Pro rata freight was allowed. On
principle, however, the shipowner's unwillingness or inability to go on not
being shown, full freight should have been allowed, if the shippers insisted on
taking their cargo. That would be the rule of continental law, where there
was a possibility and willingness to forward the goods. Belgium (Arts. 89, 92,
94), France (Arts. 296, 299), Germany (Arts. 637, 638, 64o), Holland (Arts.
478, 5o2), Italy (Arts. 570, 572), Portugal (Art. 549), Spain (Arts. 677, 683).
"[gg, H. L.] A. C. 16. Under principles of continental law, full freight
would likewise have been held due.
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crew in leaving the ship yielded only to force, there was no abandon-
ment without intention to return, but only a temporary interruption
entitling the shipowner to proceed to earn his freight when he recovered
his vessel. But-they apparently left out of account the important
evidential fact that the master thought the ship had sunk and so tele-
graphed his owners, thus indicating clearly that he had no intention of
returning. Lord Sumner, in his dissent, alone stressed this fact, which
to the writer seems decisive. Justifiable abandonment is always induced
by supervening force maieure, and it would seem not to be material
whether nature or the armed force of the enemy is the operative cause3 7
(f) No freight has been held due when the cargo was disposed of
(or there has been some default) by the master or shipowner ott ane
intermediate port.
There have been many cases in which a cargo from a stranded or
damaged ship has been sold in an intermediate port by the master.
Often these sales are necessary, and are made in the best interests of
all parties concerned. But whether justifiable-for example, to obtain
funds for repairs or to save as much as possible out of a perishable or
damaged cargo3 8-or unjustifiable and unlawful,39 no freight is allowed
the shipowner, unless there has been such authority from the shipper
as to warrant the courts in implying a new agreement to pay freight.
The theory supporting these decisions is that the master by his own
act has placed it out of his power to carry on the cargo and earn his
freight.
In Welch v. Hicks,4 0 the vessel having stranded on the voyage, the
owner of the cargo negotiated for several days with the master in order
to induce him either to repair his vessel and forward the goods or to
hire another ship. The master refused to do either. It was held that
the owner, under these circumstances, was entitled to take his goods
without payment of freight. The wilful default in duty of the master
forfeited his claim to freight.
'In The Appatn, supra note 16, at p. 236, a similar ouster of the crew of a
ship by an enemy raider and her carriage to a port thousands of miles out of
her course was construed as an abandonment. Continental law would probably
have allowed pro rata freight to the place of capture in this case, the goods
not having been completely lost to the owner. France (Art. 303), Germany
(Arts. 630, 632), Holland (Art. 483), Italy (Art. 578), Spain (Art. 662).
'8Hopper v. Burness; supra note 25; Hill v. Wilson, supra note 3X; The
Industrie, supra note 4.
The continental rule is different. Full freight is due on goods thus sold,
if the ship reaches her destination; pro rata freight, if she does not. Belgium
(Art. 93), France (Art. L28), Germany (Art&. 632, 638, 640), Italy (Art. 575),
Portugal (Art. 555), Spain (Art. 659).
"The Harriet (1848, E. D. Penn.) Fed. Cas. 6094; Sampayo v. Salter, supra
note 3o; Hunter v. Prinsep, supra note 27; Van Omeron v. Dowick (i8og, K. B.)
2 Camp. 42.
(826, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 6 Cow. 5o4. See also Portland Bank v. Stubbs (x8io)
6 Mass. 4
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In all these cases where no freight was held to have been earned, it
will have become apparent that the failure to deliver the cargo at
destination was due either to an unforeseen event beyond control of the
parties, or to the act or omission of the shipowner or master. The
cargo-owner's conduct was in no sense a contributing cause to the
default. As will presently be observed, where the courts have been able
to construe the act or omission of the cargo-owner as an operative fact
contributing either directly or indirectly to the default or non-delivery,
they have granted the shipowner some freight, either entire or in part,
depending upon the circumstances.
FULL FREIGHT
It has already been observed that upon the happening of a maritime
disaster interrupting the voyage at an intermediate port, the contract
is not terminated, but the master has the privilege either of repairing
his ship and carrying on or of iransshipping the cargo in another vessel.
There appears to be some difference among the early authorities on
maritime law as to whether this was a duty of the master or merely a
privilege. By the Rhodian law, the laws of Oleron, and the ordinances
of Wisbuy it appears to have been a privilege; by the French Ordon-
nance de la Marine, it appears to have been a duty.4' At all events,
in Anglo-American maritime law it appears to be the master's privilege,
if he desires to earn his full freight. "Perils of the sea" being usually
excepted in the bill of lading or charter-party, he will not be under a
duty to go on, but he cannot of course demand any freight, unless the
shipper prevents him from carrying out his intention to go on. It
has also been noted that the master has a reasonable time to determine
what he will do, and a reasonable time to carry out his decision.
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(a) Full freight is due where the shipper by act or omission prevents
the shipowner or master from completing the voyage.
Numerous cases have arisen in which the cargo-owner has demanded
his goods at an intermediate port, or has declined to permit the master
to proceed with the voyage. This default or waiver by the shipper,
the master being willing and able to go on within a reasonable time, is
deemed to entitle the shipowner to his full freight. Should the master
be unwilling or unable to forward the cargo, he will then be deemed
to have terminated the contract and, as we have seen, the shipper may
have his cargo without payment of freight. But to bring about this
' The controversy among the French authorities as to whether it was a privi-
lege or duty is summarized by Lord Denman, with citation of authority, in
Shipton v. Thornton (1838, Q. B.) I P. & D. 216, 232. According to the law of
Belgium (Art. 94), France (Art. 296), and Holland (Art. 478), the captain must
hire another vessel to carry the goods forward. If he cannot do so, practically in
all continental countries he is entitled to pro rata freight.
aBy Lord Kingsdown in Cargo ex Galam, supra note 2, at p. 178; Clark v,
Mass. Fire and Marine Ins. Co., supra note 12.
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result, there must be clear evidence of the master's -inability or unwill-
ingness, such, for example, as an overt act of abandonment. If the two
parties agree, expressly or by implication, to waive further carriage
and the shipper voluntarily accepts his cargo, pro rata freight, as will
presently be shown, is due.
Judge Story in a well-reasoned opinion in the Circuit Court in
Jordan v. Warren Ins. Co.4 3 gave what is believed to be a correct if
not complete exposition of the law:'
"It is as clear that after the shipment of the cargo on the voyage, the
shippers have no right to demand it at any intermediate port, short of
the port of destination, without payment of full freight for the voyage,
whether the cargo arrive there in a damaged or in an undamaged state.
The reason is obvious. The master has a right to carry on the cargo to
the port of destination; and if his ship be capable, either then or within
a reasonable time, to carry the cargo to the port of destination, there
is no ground to say that he is not entitled to earn a full freight; and
the shippers of the cargo cannot insist on changing the original contract
in invitum, and cut him off from all freight or dismiss him with a pro
rata freight ...
"If [the shippers] did not choose to pay the freight, the master had
a right to retain the cargo for the payment thereof, or to prepare it
again for reshipment, as soon as it could be safely done, unless the
owners refused to allow it to be again reshipped on the voyage. If
they did so refuse, then the contract for full freight would have been
complete on the part of the shipowner, from the default on the other
side.""'
A unique case illustrating the principle arose during the recent war.
The German steamer Dacia, while in an American port in 1914, having
been purchased by an American citizen and transferred to the American
"Supra note 13, at p. 354. See also Story's statement in the earlier case of
The Nathaniel Hooper, supra note io: "And I think the whole of the cases, in
which the full freight is upon the ordinary principles of commercial law due, not-
withstanding the non-arrival of the goods at the port of destination, may be
reduced to the single statement, that the non-arrival has been occasioned by no
default or inability of the carrier ship, but has been occasioned by the default or
waiver of the merchant-shipper. In the former case, the merchant-shipper can-
not avail himself of his own default to escape from the payment of freight; in
the latter case he dispenses with the entire fulfillment of the original contract for
his own interest and purposes." A mere temporary interruption of the voyage by
maritime disaster, not putting an end to the possibility of continued carriage,
would not, of course, constitute a "default or inability of the carrier ship." So
by continental law generally, if the shipper declines to wait until repairs are com-
pleted and demands his goods at the port of refuge, full freight is due; pro rata
freight would be due if the shipper can prove that the shipowner was unable or
unwilling after reasonable time to -proceed or transship. Belgium (Arts. 89, 92),
France (Arts. 296, 299), Germany (Arts. 637, 640), Holland (Arts. 478, 502),
Italy (Arts. 57o, 572), Portugal (Art. 549), Spain (Arts. 677, 684).
"The same point is illustrated by Palmer v. Lorillard, supra note io; The Sob-
loansten (i866, Adm.) L. R. i A. & E. 293, 298; Braithwaite v. Power (18gi)
i N. Dak. 455, 48 N. W. 354- See also Schouler, Bailments (3d ed., 1897) sec.
_q28; 2 Parsons, Contracts (9th ed., 19o4) 425.
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flag, was chartered to carry a cargo of cotton from Galveston to Rotter-
dam, the final destination of the cotton being Bremen. The shipowner
was assured by the Solicitor of the State Department that the transfer
of flag was legal. The British Government, however, while not having
as yet declared cotton contraband, had no disposition to encourage
the cotton trade of the South with Germany, and let it be known that
they would probably take the ship into a prize court for adjudication;
but they assured the shipper, in conference in Washington, that they
would either forward the cotton or purchase it at the full Bremen
contract price. The shipper thereupon made all his arrangements
to sell the cotton to the British Government. This he preferred to
forwarding, as he thereby saved freight charges from Rotterdam to
Bremen. The ship, however, was seized, not by the British but by the
French, and taken into Brest on March 1, 1915. While the shipowner
was still negotiating for the release of his ship, which was ultimately
condemned and confiscated by a French prize court under a French
interpretation of the Declaration of London, the shipper imme-
diately requested the French Government to adhere to the British
assurance; and on obtaining assent, requested the French government
and the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, insurers of the cargo, that the
cargo be not forwarded to Rotterdam, but that it be purchased, as
he had made all his arrangements accordingly. He received from the
French Government the full Bremen contract price. He then began
suit against the-shipowner for the return of the prepaid freight, on the
ground that the ship had failed to deliver her cargo at Rotterdam,
her original destination. Although he subsequently reduced his claim
alternatively to a pro rata return, his claim was completely dismissed
by the United States District Court and by the Circuit Court of
Appeals4 5 on the ground (i) that there was no equity in his claim;
(2) that he had voluntarily substituted the port of Brest for Rotterdam
as a destination; and (3) that by so doing, he had himself deprived
the shipowner of the possibility of delivering the cargo at Rotterdam,
as the latter had the privilege of doing by transshipment in another
steamer if necessary.
(b) Where a substituted or alternative destination, measurably near
the original one, was within the contemplation. of the shipper or the
contract, or has been accepted by the shipper to his pecuniary advan-
tage, full freight has been allowed.
These cases are naturally uncommon; yet there have been several
whose peculiar facts showed that the shipper was desirous of having
the cargo at the substituted port, though this was not mentioned in the
contract. The allowance of full freight could not therefore be made
under the contract, but was made either under the equitable jurisdiction
of a court of admiralty or under a new implied contract. The cases
arose first in prize courts, which admittedly have a wide jurisdiction
, Owens v. Breitung, supra note Io.
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as to allowance of freight, but the equitableness of the rule of maritime
law adopted has induced its acceptance in other courts.
Lord Stowell first dealt with this type of case in the Prize Court.
The case of The Diata48 involved a shipment made by British merchants
on a Dutch vessel from a Dutch colony to Amsterdam, Holland, sent
there because of the narrow colonial policy of the early nineteenth
century evidenced here by the regulations of Holland, but intended
really to be reshipped to London, the natural market of the goods.
War having broken out, the ship was seized and the cargo restored to
its British owners, and the question was whether full freight should
e allowed the captors, who stood in the shoes of the shipowner.
Lord Stowell, then Sir William Scott, held that London having been
the real intended destination in the contemplation of the shippers,
though not the chartered destination, and the substituted destination
being exceedingly beneficial to them, full freight should be allowed.
He admitted that mere accidental advantage accruing from a fortuitous
entry into an intermediate port would not vary the ordinary rule that
freight is conditioned on delivery at destination, but in this case he
concluded that the substituted destination was the real one within the
contemplation of the shipper.
Lord Stowell in his opinion in The Frienzds17 explained on equitable
considerations his allowance of full freight to certain American ships
bound for Holland and France, which were taken into England under
the prohibitory Orders in Council, the cargo being released and sold
advantageously in England. He said:
"In the case of the American ships bound to France or Holland,
which were brought into the ports of this country under the prohibitory
law, the full freight was pronounced to be due where the owners of
the cargoes elected to sell here; where they did not elect to sell here,
the court left it to them to settle the freight with the owners of the
ships. The court considered a voyage from America to this country
very nearly the same in effect as a voyage to those contiguous countries
to which those vessels were originally destined; in all probability the
markets of this country were not less favorable than in the blockaded
ports, and no doubt.the sale was effected with every attention to the
interests of the owners of the cargo. In those cases the court gave the
master the full benefit of the freight, not by virtue of his contract,
because looking at the charter-party in the same point of view as the
courts of common law, it could not say that the delivery at a port in
England, was a specific performance of its terms. But there being
no contract which applied to the existing state of facts, the court
found itself under an obligation to discover what was the relative
equity between the parties. This court sits no more than the courts
of common law do to make contracts between parties; but as a court
exercising an equitable jurisdiction, it considers itself bound to provide,
as well as it can, for that relation of interests which has unexpectedly
0 (I8O3, Adm.) 5 C. Rob. 68. No such preference of the shippers appeared in
The Fortuna, Lsupra note 30, so that the ordinary rule of no freight was applied.
S(i8o, Adm.) Edw. 246.
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taken place under a state of facts out of the contemplation of the
contracting parties in the course of the transaction."
Sir Robert Phillimore, in his decision in The Teutona,48 stated that
though these decisions were made in prize jurisdiction, they were
authoritative, as Lord Tenterden had said, in the Admiralty Court
generally. In that case, it will be recalled the Privy Council allowed
full freight 9 for a delivery at Dover instead of Dunkirk, France,
an illegal destination for the German ship by reason of the outbreak
of the Franco-Prussian War, on the ground that the charter-party
permitted of a construction making Dover an alternative destination.
The case of Owens v. Breitung, recently decided by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, allowed full freight to the shipowner on the ground
that the shipper had elected the intermediate port as his alternative
destination. 0
In these cases the cargo-owner is deemed to have accepted delivery
at a place different from that originally agreed upon, but under circum-
stances indicating that such delivery was intended to be treated as a
substituted or substantial performance of the contract.
(c) Prize courts prior to i856 frequently decreed full freight to
neutral ships seized because of their enemy cargoes, even where the
cargoes were ultimately restored to the shippers.
Prior to the Declaration of Paris, when the neutral flag did not
necessarily cover enemy cargo, it was the practice to seize the neutral
ship, unload the noxious cargo and then permit the ship to proceed.
It was customary to pay the vessel full freight, however small a part
of the voyage may have been completed, capture being treated as
equivalent to delivery. The captors had, of course, prevented the
completion of the voyage and it was unfair that the neutral should be
thus penalized, in the absence of culpability, especially when the captor
could without hardship afford to be generous out of his unexpected
spoils.5'
This rule has been applied in prize courts even where the suspected
cargo was ultimately released.5" While the ship was deemed obliged
to wait a reasonable time to see what happened to the cargo, Lord
Stowell favored the shipowner by requiring but a short stay. Even
where the ship was still in port after a long detention, he did not require
G (1871, Adm.) L. R. 3 A. & E. 394, 421.
" (1872, P. C.) L. R. 4 A. C. 171, 183. See also the prize cases of The Juno,
supra note 2o, at p. 175, dictum of Sir Samuel Evans, and The Jolo, note 21, at
p. 216, in which latter case practically full freight was allowed.
'Supra note 1o: "The sum and substance of the matter is that the libellant
agreed to substitute the port of Brest for the port of Rotterdam." (Per curiam.)
"The Copenhagen (1799,'Adm.) i C. Rob. 289; The Prosper (i8og, Adm.)
Edw. 72, 76. (The Danish neutral ship having by the outbreak of war with Den-
mark become an enemy, her full freight was then seized by the British Crown in
prize.)
"The Racehorse, supra note io.
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her to reload the restored cargo as a condition of her right to claim
full freight;5s he decided in The Hoffnung that the unlivery of the
cargo had terminated the contract of affreightment. But if that were
so, then he ought not to have required the ship to wait even a reason-
able time, as he said in The Racehorse, to see what befell the cargo.
Of course, if the ship, though neutral, was guilty of carrying simulated
papers or contraband, no freight would be allowed her on captured or
detained goods. 5'
At the beginning of the recent war, several British ships happened
to be on voyages with German goods destined for Germany. The voy-
age, of course, became illegal by the outbreak of war. In The Juno,"
a British ship thus freighted put into an English port, but instead of
full freight being allowed as in the case of capture, Sir Samuel Evans
decreed only freight pro rata, submitting the amount to reference.
It is not dear why the old principle of the neutral ship with enemy cargo
should not have been applied to the supervening illegality of a voyage
to the enemy,5 except on the theory that the British ship may be
deemed affected with a disability not attributable to a neutral; on this
theory no freight would have been allowed, but for the fact that she
had sailed before the outbreak of war.
In the cases where full freight has been decreed notwithstanding an
uncompleted voyage it will have become apparent that the fault or
cause lay with the cargo or its owner.
PRO RATA FREIGHT
The determination of a rule of law as to pro rata freight is made
difficult by the fact that courts both of common law and of admiralty
or prize have dealt with the subject; the former, seeking to find a
guide and justification in the strict principles of contract law, the latter
seeking to do equity or justice between ship and cargo. It is well,
therefore, in endeavoring to establish a rule to deal with each separately,
and to direct attention to the operative facts which may be deemed to
have influenced the court's decision in particular cases.
The question of pro rata freight has arisen where an unexpected
contingency, such as peril of the sea or capture, has placed the owners
of the cargo in control of their goods at a place short of the original
destination. It has already been observed that when the goods are
taken by the owner against his will, either from the master or at the
hands of the court, in specie or in' the form of the proceeds of a sale,
no freight is due. On the other hand, if he demands the goods, but
the master desires and is able to go on within a reasonable time, the
" The Martha (18oo, Adm.) 3 C. Rob. Io6, note; The Hoffnung (i8o5, Adm.)
6 C. Rob. 232.
"The Rising Sun (799, Adm.) 2 C. Rob. lO4; The Sarah Christina (179,
Adm.) I C. Rob. 237.
"Supra note 2o.
'See an interesting comment by T. Baty in (1915) 40 LAw MAG. & R v., 2o8.
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shipper can have them only on paying full freight. What then of
the case where both shipper and master are willing to have the goods
taken over by the shipper at an intermediate port and to dispense with
the further carriage? Here the courts, in seeking to justify some
allowance of freight, have spelled out of the circumstances a tacit
renunciation of the original contract and a new implied agreement
on the part of each to pay and accept, respectively, freight pro rata
itineris peracti. The rule in its customary form is well stated by
Baron Parke in Vlierboom v. Chapman 
7
"To justify a claim for pro rata freight there must be a voluntary
acceptance of the goods at an intermediate port, in such a mode as to
raise a fair inference that the further carriage of the goods was inten-
tionally dispensed with."
The difficulty arises in determining under the circumstances what
is a "voluntary acceptance." The acts of both master and shipper
ought to require equal scrutiny, for both must consent in order that
a new agreement may be inferred. In the usual case of shipwreck
and salvage or of capture of ship and cargo, shipowner and cargo-
owner each looks after his own interest without collaboration, and
the courts must then determine from the conduct of each what was
his intention with respect to the contract of affreightment. It seems,
however, that the actions of the shipper are of greater interest to the
courts, the presumption being that the master, if his ship is repaired
or released, or if he is given an opportunity to hire another ship,
would wish to go on with the carriage. Hence the master is often
passive in the matter. He need not offer to send the goods forward.
58
He need merely show -that he was in a position to go on within a
reasonable time, provided the shipper does not relieve him even of
" Supra note 29. Among the best of the American cases illustrating the princi-
ple of pro rata freight, and exemplifying various forms of "voluntary acceptance"
are: Pinto v. Atwater (i8o4, Conn.) i Day, 193; Williams v. Smith (x8o4, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 2 Caines, 13; Coffin v. Storer (18o9) 5 Mass. 252; Gray 'v. Wa n (1816,
Pa.) 2 S. & IL 229, 257; Propeller Mohawk (1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 153; British
and Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co. (1896, C. C. A. 2d) 72 Fed.
285.
' Luke v. Lyde, supra note 16. In the earlier case of Lutwidge v. Grey (1733,
H. L.) in Abbott, Shipping (5th ed., 1827) 307, it even seems that the master of
a ship from Virginia to Glasgow, disabled off Ireland, refused to send the goods
on to Glasgow, their destination, but only to "Great Britain," yet pro rata freight
was allowed; probably this would not be followed to-day. The shippers them-
selves forwarded the goods to Glasgow, and doubtless the benefit they received
from the carriage to Ireland influenced the decision. In Luke v. Lyde the facts
would also seem to show that the master was requested to carry the goods from
Biddleford to Lisbon, but declined, and yet pro rata freight was allowed. The
conditions upon which pro rata freight is now allowed which in addition to vol-
untary acceptance by the shipper, practically always involve some benefit to him
from their carriage to the intermediate port, are negatived by the facts in Luke v.
Lyde. Even where the British Vice-Consul, acting under instructions from the
shipper, forwarded the goods from an intermediate port to their destination,
Where they were accepted by the shipper, pro rata freight to the intermediate port
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this burden by demanding the goods at once. It is the conduct of the
shipper to which the courts will look in determining whether the
acceptance was voluntary. If he insists on having his goods at once,
without giving the master an opportunity to carry them on or to
indicate his intentions, he will be held to pay full freight. But if he
accepts them under circumstances showing that he is neither too
eager to take them out of the hands of the master nor so reluctant as
to indicate distinct opposition,5 9 his acceptance will be deemed to have
been voluntary, provided the master was in a position to go forward
with the cargo then or shortly thereafter and did not oppose their
surrender.
A somewhat different situation arises where the goods are sold at
the intermediate port by a court of admiralty, in salvage, prize or other
proceedings. It has been observed that when the master sold the
goods, whether justifiably or not, without the consent of the owners,
no freight was allowed, even where the shipper accepted the proceeds.60
The absence of any option to have the goods go forward deprived
the acceptance of the proceeds of its voluntary character.
The question arises, where the sale is made by the court on its own
authority in the interests of all parties, whether freight pro rata ought
not to be allowed. Although the question has been much debated
and decided in different ways, the weight of authority denies the right
of the shipowner to freight, if the sale was effected without consent of
the shipper.
In The Friends,s ' a ship had gone up to the very mouth of the river
of her port of destination, when she was captured. After recapture,
both ship and cargo were sold to pay salvage, and Lord Stowell
allowed the shipowner, "as a court exercising an equitable jurisdiction,"
half the charter freight. Justice Story disapproved this decision in
The Nathaniel Hooper, asserting that Lord Stowell himself had practi-
cally overruled the decision in his later judgment in The Louisa.6 2
In The Nathaniel Hooper, Story refused to allow pro rata freight on
various lots of cargo sold by the court to pay duties or salvage or by
reason of its perishable nature.
There is, however, a dictum by Lord Mansfield in Baillie v. Moudig-
was allowed the shipowner on the ground that the acceptance by the Vice-Consul
under instruction was a constructive acceptance there by the shippers them-
selves. Mitchell v. Darthez (x836, C. P.) 2 Bing. N. C. 555, 570. In The Leptir,
supra note 35, pro rata freight was allowed in a salvage suit at an intermediate
port, where the cargo-owners requested delivery. It would seem, on principle,
that full freight might well have been allowed; but it is not clear that the ship
was in a position to go on.
In The Nathaniel Hooper, supra note io, the master first offered to carry the
goods on in the ship when repaired, but afterwards sold the ship, making their
carriage impossible; the owners therefore took the goods with what Judge Story
called "a reluctant acquiescence forced upon them by an overruling necessity."
He allowed pro rata freight, a decision which to-day would be more than doubt-
ful, although it would be the general rule in continental maritime law.
' Supra, p. 374. ": Supra note 47. a Supra note 15.
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&ni63 that when ship and cargo were sold in prize proceedings under
a condemnation subsequently reversed, that the shipowner ought to
have pro rata freight out of the proceeds of the sale of the cargo,
neither ship nor cargo being in fault; and this dictum receives much
support from Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Hunter v. Prinsep,
84 for
had ship and cargo been released in specie, the vessel would have had
the privilege of going on to earn her full freight. So where in a
sale of the cargo for salvage at an intermediate port the owners were
requested to put up a bond to secure the release of the cargo, but
declined, it was concluded that they had assented by implication to
take the money in place of the goods and were therefore liable for pro
rata freight. 5
From prize cases no definite principles can be derived.
6 6 In a case
where both cargo and ship were restored, first the former and some time
afterwards the latter, Lord Stowell allowed pro rata freight to the
ship on the ground that by act of the court an innocent shipowner had
been prevented from completing his contract.8 7  When the cargo was
in fault, but not the ship, we have seen that captors were usually
allowed full freight. Yet during the recent war when voyages to
Germany became illegal to British ships which put into England and
discharged their enemy cargoes, Sir Samuel Evans allowed only pro
rata freight, laying down the following rule for the guidance of
referees :6
"Such a sum is to be allowed for freight as is fair and reasonable in
all the circumstances, regard being had to the rate of freight originally
agreed (although this is not necessarily conclusive in all cases), to the
extent to which the voyage has been made, to the labour and cost
expended, or any special charges incurred in respect of the cargo
seized before its seizure and unlivery, and to the benefit accruing to
the cargo from the carriage on the voyage up to the seizure and
unlivery; but no sum is to be allowed in respect of any inconveniences
or delay attributable to the state of war or to the consequent detention
and seizure."
Doubtless this rule interprets correctly the modern standards and
criteria for the allowance of pro rata freight in cases of uncompleted
voyages.
This study will have shown the danger of accepting without quali-
fication the general formula that "freight is not earned unless the cargo
is delivered."
Supra note 28. "Supra note 27. a The Sobloinsten, supra note 44.
"Justice Hough in The Appam, supra note 16, at p. 234, pointed out that in
prize cases all incidental matters, including freight, are adjusted in the prize
court. He added: "But whether full or pro rata freight is allowed, the award is
ex aequo et bono, and not by' virtue of any contract . . .
'The Copenhagen, supra note 51.
The Juno, supra note 2o, at p. 175. But if British ship and cargo be regarded
as equally in fault or under disability, then the pro rata rule may appear generous.
See The Friends, supra note 47. The German Code (Arts. 631, 634) gives cer-
tain rules as to calculation of pro rata freight.
